Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

Paul J. Middlestadt v. Board of Review of the
Industrial Commission of Utah; Montain Fuel
Supply; Continental Casualty; Comtrol Inc.;
Workers Companesation Fund of Utah; and
Employers Reinsurance Fund : Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Theodore E. Kanell; Richard G. Sumsion; James R. Black; Benjamin J. Sims; Erie V. Boorman;
Attorneys for Respondents.
Hans M. Scheffler; Attorney for Petitioner.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Middlestadt v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah; Montain Fuel Supply; Continental Casualty;
Com, No. 920237 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3167

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

zsmsr
/••ST

v \l

)CKETNQ. j ^ ^ ^ . ^ . /

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PAUL J. MIDDLESTADT
Applicant/Petitioner,
v.

Priority No. 7

BOARD OR REVIEW of the
Industrial Commission of Utah;
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY;
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY;
COMTROL, INC.; WORKERS
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH; and
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND

Case No. 920237-CA

Defendants/Respondents,
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
Hans M. Scheffler (4246)
311 South State Street, #380
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Attorney for Petitioner

Theodore E. Kanell (1768)
Daniel L. Steele (6336)
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Attorney for Mountain Fuel and
Continental Casualty
Richard G. Sumsion (3156)
560 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
Attorney for Respondents
James R. Black (0347)
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84133
Co-counsel for Respondents
Benjamin J. Sims
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
Attorney -Industrial Commission
Erie V. Boorman
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Employer's
Reinsurance Fund
'"a**

too?

IS

's.I »

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
PAUL J. MIDDLESTADT
Applicant/Petitioner,
v.

Priority No. 7

BOARD OR REVIEW of the
Industrial Commission of Utah;
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY;
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY;
COMTROL, INC.; WORKERS
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH; and
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND

Case No. 920237-CA

Defendants/Respondents,
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
Hans M. Scheffler (4246)
311 South State Street, #380
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Attorney for Petitioner

Theodore E. Kanell (1768)
Daniel L. Steele (6336)
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Attorney for Mountain Fuel and
Continental Casualty
Richard G. Sumsion (3156)
560 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
Attorney for Respondents
James R. Black (0347)
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84133
Co-counsel for Respondents
Benjamin J. Sims
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
Attorney -Industrial Commission
Erie V. Boorman
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Employer's
Reinsurance Fund

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities

ii

Statement of Jurisdiction

1

Statement of Issues

1

Standard of Review

2

Determinative Constitutional Provisions and Statutes . . .

3

Statement of the Case

4

A. Nature of the Case

4

B. Course of Proceedings

4

C.

5

Disposition by the Industrial Commission

Statement of Facts

5

Summary of Arguments

5

Argument

8

Point I
Utah Code Annotated §35-1-65 and §31-1-66 are
clearly statutes of limitation, and not statutes
of repose

8

Point II
Sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66 are constitutionally
sound because they set forth a limited but reasonable
time in which to file for benefits
11
Point III
Sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66 are not violative of
the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution . .12
Point A
Mr. Middlestadt had an effective remedy under
§35-1-65 and §35-1-66 had he filed a timely
claim for compensation with the Commission. . . .13
Point B
Sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66 serve a clear
legislative objective and are reasonable and
concise in achieving that objective
i

18

Point IV
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-65 and §35-1-66 are nonviolative of the equal protection provision of
the Utah Constitution

19

Conclusion

21

Certificate of Mailing

23

Addendum
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Cited
Avis v. Board of Review, 837 P.2d 584
(Utah App. 1992) . . .2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22
Anderson v . P u b l i c Seirvice Commission. 190 U t . Adv.
R p t . 2 4 , (Utah 1992)

2

Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670
(Utah 1985)
7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19, 21
Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348,
(Utah 1989)

20

Jackson v. Layton City. 743 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1987) . . . 13, 14, 15
Masich v. U.S. Smelting and Ref. and Min. Co.. 191 P.2d
612, (Utah 1948) (appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 866). . . 17, 21
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, (Utah 1984)

20

McHenry v. Utah Valley Hospital, 724 F.Supp. 835,
(D. Utah 1989)

11, 19

Mvers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, (Utah 81)

18

Savage Industries v. State Tax Commission, 811 P.2d 664,
(Utah 1991)
2
Velarde v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 123
(Ut. Ct. App. 1992)
3, 13
Wrolstad v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 786 P.2d 243
(Ut. Ct. App. 1990)
16, 17, 18

ii

Constitutional Provisions
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 11

3, 12

Utah Constitution Article I, Section 24

3

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. Section
35-1-65
1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21
Utah Code Ann, Section
......

35-1-66

1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18

19, 21

Utah Code Ann. Section

35-1-82.53 (2)

1

Utah Code Ann. Section

35-1-86

1

Utah Code Ann. Section

35-1-99

8

Utah Code Arm. Section

35-2-13(a) (2)

16

Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46B-16
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25
Utah Code Ann

1, 2
14, 15, 19

§78-12-25.5

14

iii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
PAUL J. MIDDLESTADT
Applicant/Petitioner,
v.
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Defendants/Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is vested in this court pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated Sections 35-1-82.53 (2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b-16 of the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Do the filing limitations requiring a claimant to apply

for permanent partial disability payments within eight years after
the date of his injury as found in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-65 and 351-66 of the Worker's Compensation Act violate the open courts
provision of the Utah Constitution?
2.

Does Utah Code Ann. §35-1-65 and 35-1-66 of the Worker's

Compensation Act requiring workers to file claims for benefits
within eight years from the date of their injury violate the equal
protection clause of the Utah Constitution?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Since this action involves a final appealable administrative
order

from

the

Industrial

Commission

(Commission), the Utah

Administrative Procedures Act (hereinafter referred to as "UAPA")
applies and vests in this court the authority to grant relief when
the Commission "has erroneously interpreted or applied the law. .
. ." Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 (4) (d) (1989).

See also Avis v.

Board of Review, 837 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah App. 1992).

UAPA also

allows this court to extend relief to a petitioner where "the
statute

or

rule

on

which

the

agency

action

unconstitutional on its face or as applied."

is

based

is

Utah Code Ann. §63-

46b-16 (4) (a) (1989).
In reviewing the application or interpretation of a law a
correction of error standard applies and this court is entitled to
give no difference to the Commission's interpretation of the law
involved. Avis, 837 P.2d at 586.

See also Anderson v. Public

Service Commission, 190 Ut. Adv. Rpt. 24, 25 (Utah 1992) (citing
Savage Industries v. State Tax Commission, 811 P.2d 664, 669-70
(Utah 1991)).
Under UAPA, the Commission in granted discretion in applying
the law to the facts only when "there is a grant of discretion to
the agency concerning the language in question, either expressly
made in the statute or implied from the statutory language." Avis,
837 P.2d at 586.
Finally, since the Commission is not a court possessing
general jurisdiction, it did not have the authority to address the
constitutionality of the statutes challenged herein.

2
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period of eight years from the date of the
injury.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-66
Partial disability-scale of payments....The commission may make a permanent partial
disability award at any time prior to eight
years after the date of injury to any
employee. His physical condition results from
such injuries not finally healed and fixed
eight years after the date of injury and he
files an application for such purpose prior to
the expiration of such eight year period.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the case;

Mr. Middlestadt is appealing an order of the Industrial
Commission which is dated March 12, 1992.

This order denied Mr.

Middlestadt's motion for review of an order of partial dismissal1
issued by the Administrative Law Judge on November 21, 1991. R.5457.
B.

Course of Proceedings;

On May 21, 1991, Mr. Middlestadt filed an application for a
hearing before the Industrial Commission of Utah seeking, among
other things, temporary total disability and permanent partial
disability benefits.

R. 11.

On November 10, 1991 the attorneys representing the various
parties, including Mountain Fuel Supply, (hereinafter referred to
as "Mountain Fuel") met in a conference and discussed the merits of
Mr. Middlestadt's application.

As a result of that meeting the

Administrative Law Judge determined that there was no justiciable

1

on going causally related medical expenses to continue.
4

f ' ' •- eight
benel . _ ^ * ,
Order

OJDC1-L •

Dismissa

•: * aciieu o

-*--'»

w w

addendum

decision Mr. Middlestadt f-'!eJ -

Lowing

ai<«- .

X\«

filed on Decembe,
:

i

motior

Thereal ? ->J *

M~+- 7 -^

Order Denying

Middles!du. P«_; .
Thi^

granted

Disposition by the Industrial Commission;
ndustria,

^ f firmed

m t

- :

«-uc

l

smiss

Administrate
Middlestadt

Commissic

enied

ievif-

barred m s *,.•.
54-57,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Responde;.

in

Mr- Middlestadt'?

j .• •

tii I Ii • Mi till I Gstacit " s
Mountain FueJ ,

Jfii"i

o w e v e r , any t a c t s

connei

i n j u r i e s on December F5, 1980 rir, n,n»t a p p l y

i r«• !, lie 11« I o r e

J i IT; I "van!

insofar

as

to

Mountain

Fuel's position i s concerned.
SUMMARY OF
Mr. Middlestadt bears

m a t the

5

statutes

and

the

unconstitutional.

time

limitations

found

therein

are

Mountain Fuel does not bear the burden of

showing that the statutes are constitutional and this court is
entitled to apply what is otherwise been characterized as an
intermediate

level

of

scrutiny

in

its

review

of

the

constitutionality of the statutes in question.
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-65 and §35-1-66 are not statutes of
repose as Mr. Middlestadt argues in his brief.

Instead, they are

statutes of limitation or benefit limitations because they limit
the period of time in which an injured worker may seek compensation
and that limit of time is based on the occurrence of the injury or
accident.

On the other hand, a statute of repose basis its

computation of time on some event unrelated to the accident or
injury sustained by the individual.

Mr. Middlestadt has claimed

that the event as to which the applicable limitation or time period
must run are his surgeries which occurred in 1987 and 1990.
However, these surgeries are admitted to have resulted from the
original injuries sustained by the Mr. Middlestadt in 1976 and
1980.

A plain reading of the statute shows that the time period

runs from the date of the accident and injury and petitioner's
arguments that the surgeries are the event for calculating the time
are without merit.
Petitioner also cannot show the existence of any special
circumstances which would render him eligible for the equitable
exceptions to the statute of limitations. Those exceptions require
a showing that either the individual had no way of knowing that
6
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concerns of allowing the Industrial Commission to evaluate the
merits of any petition or request for benefits by having evidence
that is fresh, discoverable and reviewable, and not so distant in
time as to be rendered unreliable.
Finally, this court, in Avis v. Board of Review, 837 P.2d 584
(Utah App. 1992) upheld the very statute applicable to Mountain
Fuel's case. Mountain Fuel is a party to this action as a result
of a injury sustained by Mr. Middlestadt in 1976.

In 1976, the

applicable limitation period was set forth in Utah Code Ann. §35-199 and that statute has been held by the Avis court to be
constitutional and not in violation of the open court or equal
protection clauses of the Utah constitution.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED S35-1-65 AND S35-1--66
ARE CLEARLY STATUTES OF LIMITATION,
AND NOT STATUTES OF REPOSE
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-65 and §35-1-66

2

are not statutes of

repose as Mr. Middlestadt argues in his brief but instead are
statutes of limitations which affix an outside time limit and
require claimants to file within that time period in order to be

2

Mountain Fuel Supply is a party to this lawsuit as a result
of injuries sustained by the plaintiff in 1976.
In 1976 the
applicable time limitation period was found in Utah Code Annotated
section 35-1-99. This section was repealed in 1988 and replaced by
a similar section found at Utah Code Ann. section 35-1-98 (2). It
is Mountain Fuel's position that insofar as it is concerned,
section 35-1-99 is the only applicable provision. However, for the
sake of consistency and uniformity, Mountain Fuel will address the
issues as stated by petitioner and/or refer to sections 35-1-65 and
35-1-66 in the body of its argument.

8

eligible for benefits. 3
Statutes of limitations prohibit suits which are filed after
a statutorily specific period of time following the accrual of a
cause of action.

Avis, 837 P.2d at 587.

Statutes of Repose, on

the other hand, prohibit suits a certain number of years after a
specific event occurs and that event is unrelated to or occurs
without regard to when a petitioner's cause of action accrues. Id.
In other words, a statute of repose can serve to bar a cause of
action even where an individual's cause of action has not accrued.
The most common statutes of repose were often enacted in the
products liability context where the event affixing the time period
was the date the product was manufactured.

The time would count

from the date the product was manufactured and at the end of the
statutory period, that product no longer posed any liability risk
to the manufacturer.
Such a result occurred in the case of Berry v« Beech Aircraft
Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). In Berry the plaintiff was killed
in an airplane accident and attempted to sue the manufacturer of
the airplane on a products liability theory. However, a statute of
repose was in effect which precluded suit a certain period of time
after the manufacture of the airplane and regardless of when a
party was injured by the product.

In Berry, and subsequent cases

dealing with various statutes of repose, the Utah Supreme Court has
declared such statutes unconstitutional because they completely bar
3

The Worker's Compensation Fund has referred to the time
limits as benefit limitations. Either way the operable events that
start the limitation running are the accident and injury date.
9

an individual's right to sue regardless of when that individuals
cause of action accrues. 4
The language in §35-1-65 and §35-1-66 shows that they are
statute of limitations because they run "from the date of injury,
when the cause of action accrues, not from a point in time
unrelated to when the cause of action arose."

Avis, 837 P.2d at

587.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-65 states in pertinent part:
In no case shall such compensation
benefits exceed three hundred and twelve weeks
at the rate of 100% of the state average
weekly wage at the time of the injury over a
period of eight years from the date of injury.
Section 35-1-66 prior to the 1988 amendment which does not
apply in this case, stated that:
The commission may make a permanent
partial disability award at any time prior to
eight years after the date of injury to any
employee whose physical condition resulting
from such injury is not finally healed and
fixed eight years after the date of injury and
who files an application for such purpose
prior to the expiration of such eight year
period.
Clearly the language of both statutes link the time limitation
period to the accrual of the cause of action or in other words, the
date in which in an individual was injured. Hence, section 35-1-65
4

Statutes of Repose have met with increasing disfavor in
Utah.
See, Wrolstad v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 786 P.2d
243 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990); Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d
1087 (Utah, 1989); Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herat
Hughes & Sons, Inc., 782 P.2d 188 (Utah, 1989). To Mountain Fuel's
knowledge, only one statute of repose presently exists in Utah law.
That statute of repose is the medical malpractice limitation found
at Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4 (1992).
10

cuts off an individuals right to compensation "eight years from the
date of the injury."

Id.

Section 35-1-66 similarly allows for

permanent partial disability awards "at any time prior to eight
years after the date of injury."

Id.

It further requires

application for permanent partial disability awards within that
eight year period.

Id.

Therefore, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-65 and §35-1-66 are not
statutes of repose and the analysis found in "the Berry line of
cases is not directly applicable . . . . " Avis, 837 P.2d at 587.
POINT II
SECTIONS 35-1-65 AND 35-1-66 ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY
SOUND BECAUSE THEY SET FORTH A LIMITED BUT
REASONABLE TIME IN WHICH TO FILE FOR BENEFITS.
As

previously

noted,

"[s]tate

legislatures

possess

the

discretion to enact statutes of limitation, and these statutes are
presumptively constitutional."
limitation

is

Id.

constitutionally

Furthermore, "[a] statute of

sound

if

it

should

allow

reasonable, not unlimited, time in which to bring suit."

a

Id.

(citing McHenry v. Utah Valley Hospital, 724 F.Supp. 835, 837 (D.
Utah 1989).
determine

It is with the ambit and domain of the legislature to
what

constitutes

a

reasonable

time

and

such

a

determination is left to "the judgment of the legislature, and the
courts will not inquire into the wisdom of establishing a period of
legal bar, unless the time allowed is manifestly so insufficient
that the statute becomes a denial of justice." Avis, 837 P.2d at
587, (citations omitted).
There are exceptions which are designed to alleviate the
11

sometimes harsh application of statutes of limitation.

These

exceptions "involve cases where plaintiff[s] had no way of knowing
the injury had occurred until after the statute had run and
therefore no way of affixing or exploring potential liability
within

the

statutory

period."

Id.

at

587.

However, Mr.

Middlestadt

has

failed to argue any of the above mentioned

exceptions.

Instead, Mr. Middlestadt has chosen to argue that the

statutes are actually statutes of repose and therefore attacks the
same under the open courts and equal protection provisions of the
Utah Constitution.

As previously mentioned, the open courts

analysis and two prong test as found in the Berry line of cases, is
not directly applicable to statutes of limitation. Therefore since
Mr. Middlestadt has failed to argue or set forth any circumstances
which would make him eligible for any of the exceptions to statutes
of limitation his claims of constitutional violation are without
merit and should be summarily dismissed.
POINT III
SECTIONS 35-1-65 AND 35-1-66 ARE NOT
VIOLATIVE OF THE OPEN COURTS PROVISION
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Assuming arguendo that this court rejects Mountain Fuel's
position that §35-1-65 and §35-1-66 are statutes of limitation, and
hold that they are statutes of repose, the statutes nevertheless
pass the two prong test as outlined in the case Berry v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985).
Article 1, Section 11 of the Constitution of Utah, otherwise
known as the "open courts" provision, provides that "[a]11 courts
12

shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him and
person, property or reputation, shall have a remedy by due course
of law . . . ."

In the Berry case, the Utah Supreme Court in

striking down the products liability statute of repose under the
open

courts

provision,

outlined

a

two

prong

test

"which

contemplates both the individual rights constitutionally protected
by the open courts provision and the legislative interest in
promoting the social and economic welfare."

Velarde, 831 P.2d at

127.
First, section 11 is satisfied if the law
provides an injured person an effective and
reasonable alternative remedy "by due course
of law" for vindication of his constitutional
interest.
The benefit provided by the
substitute must be substantially equal in
value or other benefit to the remedy abrogated
in
providing
essentially
comparable
substantive protection to one's person,
property, or reputation, although the form of
the substitute remedy may be different . . . .
Second, if there is no substitute or
alternative remedy provided, abrogation of the
remedy or cause of action may be justified
only if there is a clear social or economic
evil to be eliminated and the elimination of
an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary
or unreasonable means for achieving the
objective.
Id. (citing Berry, 717 P.2d at 680) (emphasis added).

Statutes

survive the Berry analysis if either one of the two prongs of the
test is met.
POINT A
MR. MIDDLESTADT HAD AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY UNDER §35-1-65
AND §35-1-66 HAD HE FILED A TIMELY CLAIM FOR
COMPENSATION WITH THE COMMISSION.
In the case of Jackson v. Layton City, 743 P.2d 1196 (Utah
13

1987), the Utah Supreme Court addressed a constitutional attack
based on the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution.

The

claims made by the plaintiffs in Jackson also are similar in nature
to the present claim of Mr. Middlestadt.

Mr. Middlestadt's brief

is essentially arguing that no statute of limitation should apply
to

his claim

and

that

he

should

be

granted

an open ended

opportunity to pursue his remedy under the workmen's compensation
statutes.

However, nothing

in law or equity requires that

individuals be given an unlimited period of time following an
accident or injury in which they can pursue their claims.
In the Jackson case, one of the plaintiffs sustained injuries
in February of 1979 while sliding on a hill that was constructed
and maintained by Layton City.

This hill was constructed in

November 1974. Plaintiffs filed their claim against Layton City on
August

14, 1983, a date approximately 4 1/2 years after the

accident and close to nine years after the date the sledding hill
was constructed.

The trial court held that plaintiffs claim was

barred by the four year general statute of limitations applicable
to personal injuries caused by negligent conduct.

On appeal, the

plaintiffs argued that the seven year statute of limitation found
that Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-25.5 was the applicable statute
of limitations instead of the four year period for filing personal
injury actions as found at Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (2). Section
78-12-25.5 serves to limit a time in which a suit can be filed
based on a defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real
property to seven years from the date of the construction of that
14

condition or improvement.
Plaintiffs

attacked

this

statute

under

the

open

courts

provision claiming that the statute eliminated their cause of
action even before it actually accrued simply because the hill was
constructed nine years prior to their injuries and hence beyond the
seven year statute. The Utah Supreme Court disposed of plaintiffs
constitutional attacks based on the first prong of the Berry
analysis which requires that a plaintiff be given a reasonable
alternative remedy. The Jackson court held that the plaintiff "had
an effective remedy against Layton City as owner in possession of
the property that could have been filed within four years from the
date of the injury.

They cannot invoke Berry to excuse them from

their own dilatory conduct."

Id. at Jackson, 743 P.2d at 1199.

Mr. Middlestadt's position is strikingly similar to those
arguments made in the Jackson and Avis cases.

The facts are

undisputed that Mr. Middlestadt was aware of his injuries in 1976
and in 1980 as evidenced by the fact that he received worker's
compensation benefits for both injuries. Unfortunately, just as in
the Jackson and Avis cases, Mr. Middlestadt had an alternative
remedy but failed to file his claim with the Commission within
eight years from the date of his injuries. It is important to note
that the eight year statute of limitations provided by Utah Code
Ann. §35-1-65 and §35-1-66 affords Mr. Middlestadt twice the amount
of time to pursue his claims as he would have had had he otherwise
been subject to the four year statute of limitations applicable to
personal injury claims. See Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25. (1982). Mr.
15

Middlestadt clearly had an effective alternative remedy under the
act but his failure to timely pursue that remedy deprives him of
the right to proceed.
Mr. Middlestadt

relies heavily on the case Wrolstad v.

Industrial Commission of Utah, 786 P.2d 243 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990) in
asserting

his

significantly

open

courts

different

Middlestadt's situation.

and

claim.

However,

Wrolstad

easily

distinguishable

from

is
Mr.

In Wrolstad, the plaintiff developed

asbestosis some ten years after leaving his employment as an
electrician.

Mr.

Wrolstad's

claims

fell

under

the

state

Occupational Disease, Disability Compensation Act and that act had
a statute of repose which required Mr. Wrolstad to file within one
year after the termination of his employment

in order to be

eligible for workmen's compensation benefits.

This particular

statute, Utah Code Ann. §35-2-13(a)(2), was clearly a statute of
repose because the claim was barred before it arose.

The Utah

Court of Appeals found that it violated the open courts provision
of the Utah Constitution.
However, the statutory provision at issue in Wrolstad is
completely different from the statutes at issue here.

From 1976

on, Mr. Middlestadt was aware that he had suffered an industrial
accident and was further aware of his ongoing injuries and the
possible long term effects from those accidents.

Just as the

petitioner in the Avis case was aware of his injuries, so to has
Mr. Middlestadt been aware of his condition "over a period of
several years."

Avis, 837 P.2d at 588.
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It follows that Mr.

Middlestadt could have filed for the compensation he now seeks
within the statutory period, which began running on the date of his
injury and not the date he terminated his employment as in the
Wrolstad case.

Id.

What Mr. Middlestadt is seeking is just what

Mr. Avis sought in the Avis case.

Mr. Middlestadt "seeks a rule

which would postpone running of the statute until he 'discovered'
the full extent of his injury. The workman's compensation statute,
however,

does

not

require

stabilization

before

filing

for

benefits." Id. In short no matter what remedy Mr. Middlestadt had
or chose to pursue, he would still be subject to a statute of
limitations.

Id.

"His alternative remedy was to timely file."

Id.
Sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66 clearly allow Mr. Middlestadt to
seek compensation prior to the stabilization of his injuries and
any intimation on the part of Mr. Middlestadt that the surgeries on
his back, which were admittedly secondary to the injuries sustained
in 1976 and in 1980, are new injuries warranting new benefits is
clearly in error.

If anything, the surgeries were designed to

stabilize and finally fix the extent of Mr. Middlestadt's injuries
in 1976 and 1980.
It is also important to note that the workman's compensation
act itself has been held to be a constitutionally valid statutory
scheme

and

offers

a

reasonable

and

constitutionally

sound

alternative remedy. Masich v. U.S. Smelting and Ref. and Min. Co.,
191 P.2d 612, (Utah 1948) (appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 866).
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POINT B
SECTIONS 35-1-65 AND 35-1-66 SERVE A CLEAR
LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIVE AND ARE REASONABLE AND CONCISE
IN ACHIEVING THAT OBJECTIVE
In applying the second prong of the Berry analysis it is
helpful to first contrast Mr. Middlestadt's claims with the claims
made in the Wrolstad case.

In Wrolstad this court invalidated

section 35-2-13(a)(2), which set forth a one year repose period for
non-silicosis
disability.

occupational

disease

claims

resulting

in total

The Wrolstad court barely touched the second prong of

the Berry analysis and clearly felt comfortable in saying that "we
see no reasonable public policy justification for thus precluding
[the plaintiff's] right to recovery for occupational disease."
Wrolstad, 786 P.2d at 245.
In contrast, the limitation period found in §35-1-65 and §351-66 clearly represent an attempt on the part of the legislature to
establish

a ceiling

on the

filing

limitation

promote

the public

issue.

policy

The

concerns

statutes of

of

protecting

employers and the State of Utah Second Injury Fund (now called The
Employer's Reinsurance Fund) from responding or attempting to
evaluate claims which have occurred in the distant past and which
have aged to the point that "evidence has been lostr memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared."

Avis, 837 P.2d at 587,

(citing Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 81)).
Another presumption underlying the public policy concerns in
these two statutes is that the applicant seeking compensation would
act reasonably under the circumstances as well.
18

The legislature

has clearly manifested a concern that causation both medical and
legal have a reasonable basis for determination.

The Legislature

has shown that concern by enacting a statute of limitation.

Such

a piece of legislation evidences a strong legislative purpose and
meticulous efforts to achieve that purpose.

For similar reasons,

so does the four year alternative statute of limitation for other
non-worker's compensation personal injury claims under Utah Code
Ann.

§78-12-25(3)

which

has

specifically

been

found

to

be

constitutional in the case of McHenry v. Utah Valley Hospital, 724
F.Supp. 835 (D. Utah 1989).
In analyzing the Worker's Compensation Act and the benefit
limitations

contained

in §35-1-65

and

§35-1-66, it must be

remembered that the Act in total is the substitute remedy for tort
claims between employee and employer.

The principle of fault was

abolished and specific, though limited, benefits were granted. The
Appellant has presented

no arguments that would

support his

position that the substituted benefits are not reasonable under all
circumstances associated with industrial accidents.
In summary, §35-1-65 and §35-1-66 clearly do not offend the
second prong of the Berry analysis and are designed and drafted to
promote the strong public policy concerns outlined above.
POINT IV
UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1-65 AND §35-1-66
ARE NON-VTOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Mr. Middlestadt's brief briefly argues that §35-1-65 and §351-66 are unconstitutional based on unequal protection grounds.
19

However, his brief is void of any substantive analysis or argument
and he sets forth very little precedent or public policy argument
to support his claims therein.
Article

1 section 24 of the Utah constitution which is

essentially Utah's counter-part to the Federal Equal Protection
Clauser requires that "all laws of a general nature shall have
uniform application."
Just as the Utah Supreme Court has developed a two pronged
analysis for the open courts provision test, so too has the court
developed a two part test to determine whether statutes are in
violation the equal protection provision of Utah constitution. The
first prong requires that the law must apply equally to all persons
within a class.

The second prong requires that any statutory

classification which gives different

treatment

based on that

classification must be based on differences that have a reasonable
tendency to further the objectives of the statute.

Condemarin v.

University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1989) (citing Malan v.
Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984).
In Condemarin, the Utah Supreme Court indicated that the
appropriate standard of review for applying an eqrual protection
analysis requires a determination of whether or not the right
protected in the constitution provision is fundamental.
358.

Id. at

Any activity which infringes on a fundamental right will be

subject to strict scrutiny while activities which threaten nonfundamental rights will be subject only to a rational basis review.
The Condemarin Court clearly recognized that the rights protected
20

by the open court provision are non fundamental insofar as the
equal protection clause is concerned.
reason, this court

Id. at 359.

For this

need only determine whether the statutes

challenged by Mr. Middlestadt and their inherent classifications
are rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose. Id. at
356.
Mr. Middlestadt's claims, as outlined in his brief appear to
imply that any statutes of limitations which apply in the workmen's
compensation context are unconstitutional as they modify common law
rights.
has

As previously mentioned however, the Utah Supreme Court

clearly

upheld

the

workmen's

compensation

statute

as

constitutional. Masich, 191 P.2d at 612. However, the statutes of
limitation found in Sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66 clearly apply
equally to all persons in the class, that class being individuals
who are injured on the job and covered by workmen's compensation.
Again, as with the open courts provision challenge, the statute of
limitations are presumed valid and Mr. Middlestadt has failed in
any meaningful way to overcome this presumption.
CONCLUSION
When the Berry analysis and its two prong test is applied to
sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66, it becomes clear that the statute of
limitations outlined therein, are not in violation of either the
open courts provision of the Utah constitution or the equal
protection

provisions

of the same.

Mr. Middlestadt

had an

alternative remedy under act and these statutes of limitation serve
the clear legislative purpose of limiting the time in which claims
21

may be brought.

After Appellant filed this writ, this Court has

determined in the case of Avis v. Board of Review, 837 P.2d 584
(Utah App. 1992), that the statute of limitations in the Worker's
Compensation Act were constitutional. This Court should therefore
deny Appellant's request and affirm the Industrial Commission of
Utah.

In short, these statutes are clearly constitutional and the

Industrial Commission was proper in denying Mr, Middlestadt's
claims.

Therefore respondent Mountain Fuel Supply respectfully

requests this court affiann the Industrial Commission's decision
denying Mr. Middlestadt additional benefits.
DATED this

jcf

day of December, 1992.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

THEODORE E. KAtiELL
DANIEL L. STEELE
Attorneys for Mountain Fuel and
Continental Casualty
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ADDENDUM
1.

Utah Constitution Article I, Section 11

2.

Utah Constitution Article 1, Section 24

3.

Order of Dismissal

4.

Order Denying Motion for Review

Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay, and no person
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.

35-1-65. Temporary disability—Amount of payments—State average
weekly wage defined.—(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee
shall receive 66%% of his average weekly wages at the time of the injury
so long as such disability is total, but not more than a maximum of 100%
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and
not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent wife and
$5 for each dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to
a maximum of four such dependent minor children not to exceed the
average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not
to exceed 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury
per week. Tn no case shall such compensation benefits exceed 312 weeks
at the rate of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the
injury over a period of eight years from the date- of the injury.
(2) • • • [Same as parent volume].

35-1-66. Partial disability—Scale of payments.—Where the injury
causes partial disability for work, the employee shall receive, during such
disability for not to exceed 312 weeks over a period of not to exceed eight
years from the date of the injury, compensation equal to 66 2/3% of the
difference between tbat employee's average weekly wages before the
accident and the weekly wages that employee is able to earn thereafter,
but not more than a maximum of 66 2/3% of the state average weekly
wage at the time of the injury per week and in addition thereto $5 for a
dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age
of eighteen years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children,
but not to exceed 66 2/3% of the state average weekly wage at the time
of the injury per week.
The commission may make a permanent partial disability award at
any time prior to eight years after the date of injury to any employee
whose physical condition resulting from such injury is not finally healed
and fixed eight years after the date of injury and who files an application
for such purpose prior to the expiration of such eight-year period.
In case the partial disability begins after a period of total disability,
the period of total disability shall be deducted from the total period of
compensation.
In no case shall the weekly payments continue after the disability ends,
or the death of the injured person.
In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be 66 2/3%
of that employee's average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but
not more than a maximum of 66 2/3% of the state average weekly wage
at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per
week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor
child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent
minor children, but not to exceed 66 2/3% of the state average weekly
wage at the time of the injury per week, to be paid weekly for the number
of weeks stated against such injuries respectively, and shall be in addition
to the compensation hereinbefore provided for temporary total disability,
to wit:
(A) to (C) • • • [Same as parent volume.]
Permanent hearing loss caused by accident shall be determined and
paid as follows:
"Loss of hearing99 is defined as the binaural hearing loss measured in
decibels with frequencies of 500, 1000 and 2000 cycles per second (cps)
using pure tone air conduction audiometric instruments (ASA 1951) approved by nationally recognized authorities in the field of measurement of
hearing impairment Seduction of hearing ability in frequencies above
2000 cycles per second shall not be considered in determining compensable
disability.
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Applicant,
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VS.
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MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY
and/or CONTINENTAL
CASUALTY; COMTROL and/or
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FUND; and EMPLOYERS
REINSURANCE FUND,

*
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*
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ORDER OF DISMISSAL

*

Defendants.

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

The above-entitled matter having been duly considered, and it
having been determined that:

xx

1.

Respond to request for documentation.

2.

Provide medical records.

3.

Cooperate in investigating the case..

4.

Actively prosecute this matter.

5.

Other: There is no justiciable issue at this time.

And it appearing that the foregoing constitutes good cause for
dismissing the claim,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the claim of the Applicant
be, and the same is hereby, dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review or specific
written objection hereto must be filed with the Commission within
thirty (30) days from date of this Order, or it shall be the final
Order of the Commission, not sjubject to furbheg^jreview or appeal.

(Lrn^

len
Law Judge
Certified this
November 1991.
ATTEST:

21st

/s/ Patricia Ashby
Patricia Ashby
Commission Secretary
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vs.
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MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY and/or
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY, COMTROL,
INC., and/or WORKERS COMPENSATION
FUND OF UTAH, and EMPLOYERS'
REINSURANCE FUND,
Defendants•
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it
it
it
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it
it
it

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motion for
Review of applicant which was received on December 17, 1991 in the
above captioned matter, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section
35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12.
On April 2, 1985, the administrative law judge (ALJ) entered
his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order awarding the
applicant benefits which arose from industrial accidents which
occurred on August 16, 1976, and December 5, 1980. Subsequent to
the 1985 order, the applicant had two surgeries on his back for
which he seeks additional workers' compensation benefits.
Applicant claims that at the request of defendants' counsel,
an attorneys' conference was held on November 19, 1991. He also
claims that after the defendants' counsel had briefly outlined the
present claim to the ALJ, the ALJ stated that applicant had no
further claim to benefits based upon the dates of the industrial
accidents, but that the defendants must pay the applicant's medical
expenses pursuant to the April 2, 1985 order. On November 21,
1991, the ALJ entered an Order of Dismissal which stated that there
was no justiciable issue at that time.
Applicant alleges that he cannot respond to the order since no
motion was made by defendants, and since the ALJ failed to state
the basis for the order.
However, applicant states that he
understands that the ALJ's statement at the hearing indicated that
defendants must pay the medical expenses related to his industrial
accident. Defendant Workers Compensation Fund does not dispute its
responsibility for payment of these medical expenses.
The
disconnect arises as to whether the defendants are obligated to pay
for temporary total disability compensation (TTC) and permanent

PAUL J. MIDDLESTADT
ORDER
PAGE THREE
The United Parcel case is inapplicable since the tolling
provision relied upon in United Parcel became effective after the
date of Mr. Middlestadt's injuries. Id. at 141. In the instant
case, the provisions of Section 35-1-99 which apply to Mr.
Middlestadt mention no tolling provision, and further, defendant
Workers Compensation Fund is correct when it states that neither
United Parcel nor Section 35-1-99 apply in Mr. Middlestadt's case.
The statutes of limitation in Section 35-1-99 do not apply,
and the relevant statutes of limitation are contained in Sections
35-1-65 and 66 which have been discussed previously.
Although the ALJ's order could have elaborated more on his
reasons for dismissing applicant's claim, and the finding of no
justiciable issue to be litigated, we believe that the application,
the answer, and the order provide sufficient information on which
to base a dismissal. The application was dated on May 20, 1991,
and was apparently filed on that date or later. Applicant claimed
two injuries, one on August 16, 1976, and the other on December 5,
1980. Both of these dates are well beyond eight years from the
date of filing of the application.
Defendant Workers Compensation Fund's answer to the
application clearly states at Paragraph Numbers Three and Five that
any compensation based on the dates of injury alleged by applicant
would be wholly barred by statutes of limitation.
Finally, applicant states that the Utah Constitution
guarantees him a legal remedy for an injury done to his person. He
cites Wrolstad v. Ind. Comm'n. 786 P.2d 243 (Utah App. 1990) for
this proposition. The factual situation in the instant case is
completely different. The applicant's injuries occurred, claims
were filed, an order was entered, benefits were paid, and medical
expenses related to the industrial injury will continue to be taken
care of.
In Wrolstad, the filing requirement based on Mr.
Wrolstad#s disease expired prior to the cause of action arising.
This occurred in Mr. Wrolstad's case because of the extended
latency period of his disease. Since the Sections 35-1-65 and 66
are not bridled with the constitutional infirmity of Wrolstad. we
must uphold these statutes of limitation.
For all the previously stated reasons, we therefore hold that
the ALJ's decision when viewed in the perspective of the entire
record is substantially supported by the evidence.

